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VE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME 
 
Erdal GÜMÜŞ∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
Existence of monopoly and its costs to societies have been intensely 
studied. However, there has been no clear view obtained yet. Studies of rent-
seeking approach of the public choice school even make the issue more 
interesting. This paper surveys from traditional Harberger’s triangle 
approach of social costs of monopoly to the most recent studies and drive 
some conclusions from it. 
Keywords: Social costs of monopoly, Harberger’s triangle, Rent-seeking theory. 
 
ÖZET 
Bir ekonomideki monopolcü firmaların varlığı dolayısı ile söz konusu 
firmaların topluma yükledikleri maliyetler yoğun bir şekilde araştırma konusu 
yapılmaktadır. Ancak, konu üzerinde görüş birliği henüz ortaya çıkmamıştır. 
Kamu tercihi okulu rant arama yaklaşımının çalışmaları konuyu çok daha 
ilginç hale getirmektedir. Bu çalışma ile monopolün sosyal maliyetlerini 
Harberger’in üçgen yaklaşımından, yakın zamana kadar geliştirilen 
çalışmaların bir literatür taraması yapılarak değerlendirilmekte ve bazı 
sonuçlara varılmaktadır. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Monopolün sosyal maliyetleri, Harberger üçgeni, rant arama 
teorisi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The social costs of monopoly have been an interesting subject in the 
literature since Harberger’s study in 1954. Since then, many scholars such as 
Stigler (1956), Tullock (1967), Posner (1975), Wenders (1987), Browning1 
(1997), Epstein and Nitzan (2002), Brown and Yoon (2006), and others2 
have studied various aspects of the issue. Many of them have tried to 
measure empirically how large the social costs of monopoly might have 
been while others have studied the theoretical aspects of this subject. 
In an economy where a monopoly is present, there is a cost to society, 
since a monopoly firm sets its output price above the competitive 
equilibrium price level and its output level would be lower than that of 
competitive level. Hence, there will be excess demand that would not be 
fulfilled, and therefore society suffers from that gap too. 
The purpose of present study is to survey the literature briefly and 
evaluate them and drive some results. The paper is organized as follows: 
Current partial equilibrium research results are summarized in the next 
section. From Harberger’s study to most recent studies that employ general 
equilibrium methodology have been surveyed in section III. Section IV 
hosts an evaluation and conclusion. 
 
WELFARE LOSS 
Although many early studies on the social cost of monopoly power 
have been developed and analyzed the issue in the context of the 
conventional partial equilibrium framework, there have been recent studies 
that started to evaluate this issue from general equilibrium perspective. 
The social cost of monopoly was methodologically introduced by 
Harberger (1954) as the welfare triangle, ABC, which is called in the 
literature as “deadweight loss,” and “Harberger triangle,” or ‘welfare loss,” 
that is shown in figure I. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Browning (1997) offers a new factor in calculating social cost of monopoly. His 
suggestion is to include resource supply distortion effect caused by tax system. 
Taking tax distortion into consideration, his findings indicate a huge social cost of 
monopoly when comparing with the conventional estimate. 
2 Worcester (1973), Bergston (1973), Cowling and Mueller (1978), Baik (1999), 
Davis and Reilly (2000) can be mentioned here. 
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Source: Modified from Wenders (1987, 458). 
Figure 1: Harberger Triangle 
 
Harberger states that when monopoly price is above competitive level 
there would be a loss to society since buyers would buy its product (Qc-Qm) 
if it would produce at the competitive level. Thus, in the static framework, 
the area of ABC in figure I may constitute the social cost of monopoly. The 
area PmABPc is excess profit which is a transfer from consumers to 
monopolist (Harberger, 1954).  
Whether the social cost of monopoly is “just” the said triangle shown 
in figure I has been the subject of many studies. Many of these studies have 
relied on the simplicity of partial equilibrium framework while many others 
have adopted a powerful computable general equilibrium theory to analyze 
and hopefully find relatively accurate results. In the rest of this paper, we try 
to be selective and review those important studies adding a positive aspect 
to the issue.  
Tullock (1967) and Posner (1975) have extended the analysis of welfare 
loss from monopoly by considering the dynamics of monopolization as 
Baysinger and Tollison mentioned (1980). Tullock and Posner argue that 
“The existence of an opportunity to obtain monopoly profits will attract 
resources into efforts to obtain monopolies, and the opportunity costs of 
those resources are social costs of monopoly too (Posner, 1975:807).” This 
statement simply says that potential monopolists will expend resources on 
monopolizing inputs, which, as Baysinger and Tollison (1980) mention, 
would be in forms of hiring lawyers, lobbyists, improved product quality, 
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better services etc., up to the value of area I and III or rectangle of PmPcBA 
in figure I in order to acquire the rights of monopoly rents. They especially 
point out that since the process of monopolization is a transfer between 
members of society, any resources expended in this effort are socially 
wasted. Moreover, the social loss from monopoly, according to them, is not 
simply the area of the ABC triangle, but the entire trapezoid, PmACPc, as 
shown in figure I.  
Wenders has argued that “Recurring or sunk, even the largest 
specification of the Harberger and Tullock costs of regulatory 
monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs. This is because 
the analysis concentrates on the rent-seeking Tullock costs and largely 
ignores the parallel rent-defending3 Tullock costs. A proper assessment of 
such rent-defending Tullock costs might more than double the maximum 
welfare costs of regulation suggested by Posner (Wenders, 1987:456).” This 
means that consumers will also actively defend consumer surplus, and they 
will not watch when monopolists are rent-seeking. Rather they will parallely 
take actions against monopolists. This also requires some consumer 
spendings such as lobbying action, or some types of pressure on regulatory 
agencies to force monopolists to set prices as closely to competitive levels as 
possible. Wenders (1987) explains the reasons that  
Neither buyers nor sellers may refrain from spending the maximum 
amount they each have at stake. If either voluntarily spends less, they will be 
taken advantage of by the other side. In addition, there is the incentive for 
each side to compete among themselves to either achieve or avoid the 
proposed regulation. Thus, both sides may spend up to the amount each has 
at stake (Wenders, 1987:458).  
In figure I, consumers will spend as much as the area of PmACPc to 
pay the price of Pc for the good in question. In this sense, Wenders claims 
that in a situation where monopolization is not binary, sellers are suggesting 
a form of regulation that would result in a Pm price, while buyers have the 
alternative of engaging in rent-defending activities that would hold the 
regulated price below Pm, say, at Pr, which might lie anywhere between Pm 
and Pc. This follows that the sellers initially propose a regulation that would 
result in price Pm, the full monopoly price. Buyers would be willing to 
spend an amount up to I+II to water down the proposed regulation so only 
price Pr came about. For the water down regulation, sellers would be willing 
to pay III + IV in figure I. Hence the total welfare costs might amount to 
the entire trapezoid between Pm and Pc that is I + II + III + IV + V 
(Wenders, 1987:458). Consequently, Wenders concludes that “when rent-
                                                 
3 Perhaps a more descriptive term would be “consumer surplus defending” [ 
Wenders footnote.] 
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defending Tullock costs are admitted to the analysis, and presuming a 
parallel kind of perfect dissipation of the consumers’ surplus lost to full 
monopoly pricing, the total welfare costs amount to a similar, but 
necessarily larger, Posner-like trapezoid computed at the unobserved full 
monopoly price (Wenders, 1987:458).”  
This conclusion, of course, is not the final conclusion. There are other 
theoretical aspects of the issue such as price elasticity of demand for goods 
in question which is also important when studying empirical aspects of the 
subject. However, we will review those aspects of the issue in the next 
section. Here, it can be said, in sum, that the social costs of monopoly 
greatly vary depending upon the size of relevant elasticities, the distribution 
of monopoly markups, and of course, the size of the monopolist sector in 
the economy. Therefore, we agree with Wenders who expresses rightly that 
“At one time, the cost of monopoly was neatly settled and made its way into 
even elementary texts. By now, it should clear that these matters are far 
from settled. A new, stable, orthodoxy in the area is still a long way off 
(1987).” 
 
THE LITERATURE 
Harberger’s 1954 seminal study is one of the first influential works that 
dealt with social cost of monopoly problem. In his study, Harberger (1954) 
emphasizes about the measurement of resource misallocation and welfare 
loss due to monopoly. Based on a number of important assumptions4, he 
uses Epstein’s (1934) study as a source of data and calculates rates of return 
for each industry for the five year period, 1924-1928.5  
Harberger estimates welfare loss of monopoly in the amount of “less 
than one-tenth of one percent of the national income (Harberger, 1954:82).” 
Figure II reproduces Harberger’s original figure that shows “Welfare Loss” 
or called Harberger triangle in the literature. His main conclusion was that 
“all I want to say here is that monopoly does not seem to affect aggregate 
welfare very seriously through its effect on resource allocation (Harberger, 
1954:87).”  
                                                 
4 His assumptions are (1) “in the long run, resources can be allocated among our 
manufacturing industries in such a way as to yield roughly constant returns. 
(Harberger, 1954:77),” (2) “All firms are operating on their long run cost curves, the 
cost curves are so defined as to yield each firm an equal return on the invested 
capital, and markets are cleared (Harberger, 1954:78),” and, (3) “The elasticity of 
demand for the industry’s product is unity (Harberger, 1954:78).” 
5 Epstein, Ralph C., Industrial Profits in the United States (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1934). 
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This conclusion is very important in the sense that after this study, 
many scholars have questioned both sides of his study; theoretically and 
empirically. Another feature of his study is that it was one of the first 
comprehensive studies dealing with monopoly and resource allocation.  
The weak point in Harberger’s study is his assumptions on which 
Stigler (1956) raises several objections. Stigler criticizes Harberger’s 
assumptions and says “the assumption of a demand elasticity of unity is 
objectionable. A monopolist does not operate where his marginal revenue is 
zero (Stigler, 1956:34).” Thus, he says in Harberger model, welfare losses go 
up when elasticity of demand increases (Stigler, 1956:34). 
Excess Profits
Incremental 
Resources
Demand
Unit Cost
"Welfare Loss"
Price,
Cost
Quantity
 
Source: Reproduced from Harberger, 1954, 78) 
Figure 2: Traditional Harberger’s Triagle 
 
The second objection Stigler raises is that “If monopoly profits are 
capitalized, the capital of a monopolist grows in such a way that only 
competitive rates of return are being earned (Stigler, 1956:34).” Here Stigler 
indicates his objection by saying that some industries in Harberger study are 
monopolistic and some are not. In his words “The estimate of welfare 
losses is biased downward on this score. One can not believe that 
petroleum, meat-packing, railway equipment, and pianos were excessively 
competitive industries and that boots and shoes, planning mills, canned 
goods, and job printing were monopolistic (Stigler, 1956:35).” He finds 
Harberger calculation of welfare loss due to monopoly too low (Stigler, 
1956:34).  
Stigler’s study encouraged new studies on both sides and two views 
were developed on the social costs of monopoly. One of them reflects 
Harberger’s view that monopoly is not an important problem since the costs 
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it causes for society are too low, while the other view supports Stigler’s 
position that those costs might be large.  
For instance, Schwartzman (1960) tries to present some figures to 
confirm Harberger’s finding. He follows Harberger’s procedure but uses his 
own estimation of profits to measure the welfare cost of monopoly. He 
relaxes Harberger’s unit elasticity assumption by assuming a range of 
reasonable values for the elasticity of demand (Schwartzman, 1960:627). The 
welfare loss he calculated for the United States manufacturing industry for 
the year of 1954 was $ 202.5 million.6 The Harberger’s calculation for the 
year of 1953 was $225 million. Both figures were less than one percent of 
the corresponding year’s national income (Schwartzman, 1960:630). His 
conclusion is that “Since the estimates are similar to Harberger’s, they 
provide confirmation of Harberger’s general conclusion that the welfare loss 
from monopoly has been small (Schwartzman, 1960:630).” 
Kamerschen (1966) argues that the social costs of monopoly were 
much larger than what Schwartzman and Harberger found. Kamerschen 
agrees with Stigler on the fact that the welfare loss would be larger than 
what has been estimated. In this context, Kamerschen’s study is an 
application of Harberger’s technique, and is more comprehensive. In the 
light of previous studies in this area, he makes some further realistic 
assumptions and uses various values of price elasticity of demand and 
concludes that 
Estimating by a number of alternative methods, we calculate ‘welfare 
losses’ that range from 1 to 8 percent of the average national income. 
Therefore, this study suggests that the ‘welfare losses’ in the American 
economy are of a significantly different magnitude from what previous 
studies had indicated and are of a higher order of magnitude. Using what 
appear to be most realistic estimates-based on after-tax income, fully 
adjusted profit rates with industry-by-industry elasticity data- we obtain 
losses of roughly 6 percent of the average national income (Kamerschen, 
1966:235).  
This conclusion is important when we look at the previous empirical 
studies. There is an important increase in the amount of welfare loss 
calculation. This is because every study adds positive contribution to the 
subject along with available data.  
Tullock’s (1967) study is a good example of an important theoretical 
contribution to the field after Harberger’s study. Tullock advocates that the 
                                                 
6  The original calculated welfare loss was $ 234 million, however, the author of the 
article has made a correction in his later article: “The effect of Monopoly; A 
Correction,” Journal of Political Economy, October 1961, pp. 494. 
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social costs that monopoly causes are much larger than the Harberger 
triangle. His contribution to the subject briefly is that  
The rectangle to the left of the welfare triangle is the income transfer 
that a successful monopolist can extort from the customers. Surely we 
should expect that with a prize of this size dangling before our eyes, 
potential monopolists would be willing to invest large resources in the 
activity of monopolizing. In fact the investment that could be profitably 
made in forming a monopoly would be larger than this rectangle, since it 
represents merely the income transfer. The capital value, properly 
discounted for risk, would be worth much more. Entrepreneurs should be 
willing to invest resources in attempts to form a monopoly until the 
marginal cost equals the properly discounted return. The potential 
customers would also be invested in preventing the transfer and should be 
willing to make large investments to that end. Once the monopoly is 
formed, continual efforts to either break the monopoly or muscle into it 
would be predictable. Here again considerable resources might be invested. 
The holders of the monopoly, on the other hand, would be willing to put 
quite sizable sums into the defense of their power to receive these transfers 
(Tullock, 1967:231). 
He gives an example that “the cost of a football pool is not measured 
by the cost of the winner’s ticket, but by the cost of all tickets. Similarly, the 
total costs of monopoly should be measured in terms of the efforts to get a 
monopoly by the unsuccessful as well as the successful (Tullock, 1967:232).” 
As his important contribution to the subject he concludes that the resources 
put into monopolization and defense against monopolization would be a 
function of the size of the prospective transfer. Since this would be 
normally large, we can expect that this particular socially wasteful type of 
‘investment’ would also be large. The welfare triangle method of 
measurement ignores this important cost, and hence greatly understates the 
welfare loss of monopoly (Tullock, 1967:232). 
Tullock’s work may be thought as an important contribution to the 
subject in two respects; (1) it considers the rectangle to the left of the 
Harberger’s triangle, PmABPc in figure I, as social cost of monopoly in 
addition to triangle. (2) It opens an argumentative door that questions 
whether the efforts of potential monopolists and consumers can be 
regarded socially wasteful and, therefore, to be added to the social cost of 
monopoly.  
It is especially interesting to mention Worcester (1973) study that 
follows a similar analogy of Harberger’s study (1954) and claims that “the 
present study attempts to reveal monopoly loss which in other studies was 
hidden in ‘industries’ which include both profitable and unprofitable firms 
by using data presented by Fortune Magazine for the 500 largest industrial 
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firms in the U.S. for each year, 1956 through 1969 (Worcester, 1973:234).” 
Thus he claims courageously that previous estimations of social costs of 
monopoly may have been underestimated. However, he concludes “The 
estimates of welfare loss to monopoly reported here are substantially lower 
than anticipated when this research was undertaken. ...I can only conclude 
that there is very little ground for the common belief that a large loss of 
welfare exists due to the economic impact of monopoly power. …as a social 
scientist I believe that the burden of proof now rests on those who believe 
the loss is large (Worcester, 1973:244).”  
An empirical study similar to the traditional Harberger’s method was 
done by Siegfried and Tiemann (1974). They apply a strictly partial 
equilibrium framework and conclude that “The results of our analysis show 
that the bulk of the welfare loss due to monopoly is concentrated in 
relatively few industries (Siegfried and Tiemann, 1974:190-191).” They 
suggest that “a policy to reduce monopoly power in specific industries may 
possess a greater benefit/cost ratio than the benefit/cost ratio for 
restructuring the whole manufacturing sector. Marginal adjustments in 
market structure may be desirable even if a total restructuring is 
unwarranted (Siegfried and Tiemann, 1974:191).”  
Posner’s (1975) study can be viewed as one of the most important 
contributions to this literature. Posner (1975) agrees with Tullock (1967) on 
the measurement of social cost of monopoly which is not simply 
Harberger’s triangle but the rectangle to the left of the welfare loss triangle 
too. In his words “the existence of an opportunity to obtain monopoly 
profits will attract resources into efforts to obtain monopolies, and the 
opportunity costs of those resources are social costs of monopoly too 
(Posner, 1975:807).” Posner makes three basic assumptions and constructs a 
model to calculate the social cost of monopoly. He states firms expenditures 
will be as much as total monopoly profit that  
If 10 firms are vying for a monopoly having a present value of $1 
million, and each of them has an equal chance of obtaining it and is risk 
neutral, each will spend $100,000 (assuming constant costs) on trying to 
obtain monopoly. Only one will succeed, and his costs will be much smaller 
than the monopoly profits, but the total costs of obtaining monopoly-
counting losers’ expenditures as well as winners’- will be the same as under 
certainty (Posner, 1975:812). 
He separates monopolies as regulated monopolies and private 
monopolies, and especially stresses that social costs of a regulated monopoly 
probably exceed the costs of private monopoly (Posner, 1975:818-819). His 
main conclusion is that previous studies of the costs of monopoly may have 
grossly underestimated those costs, and the costs of monopoly are quite 
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probably much greater in the regulated than in the unregulated sector of the 
economy (Posner, 1975:821).  
Cowling and Mueller (1978) raise several objections against the 
Harberger approach. They use partial equilibrium analysis and estimate 
welfare loss from monopoly using procedures derived to meet their 
objections (Cowling and Mueller, 1978:727). They state that “all previous 
estimates of monopoly welfare losses suffer in varying degrees from the 
same biases incorporated in Harberger’s original estimates (Cowling and 
Mueller, 1978:727).” After they explain four substantive criticisms of the 
Harberger approach and follow Tullock’s (1967) and Posner’s (1975) 
methods, they calculate the welfare loss by measuring at the firm-level for 
both the United States and United Kingdom. They conclude that “our 
figures and supporting analysis further demonstrate that ‘the monopoly 
problem’ is broader than traditionally suggested. A large part of this 
problem lies not in the height of monopoly prices and profits per se, but in 
the resources wasted in their creation and protection (Cowling and Mueller, 
1978:744).”  
This conclusion, driving from empirical estimation, supports what 
Tullock (1967) and Posner (1975) advocated. Additionally they suggest, 
contrary to those who argue that the social cost of monopoly is small, thus 
the monopoly problem is unimportant, that “still further weight would be 
added against the position that monopoly power is unimportant if the link 
with the distribution of political power were considered (Cowling and 
Mueller, 1978:746).”  
Their work was an application based on Tullock’s (1967) and Posner’s 
(1975) definitions, and their finding confirms that social costs of monopoly 
in fact are considerably higher.  
While various explanations and reasoning have been offered and 
defended on the theoretical ground of determining the social cost of 
monopoly7, others try empirically to test and come up with hopefully 
supportive results. Dixon, Gunther and Mahmood (2001) have estimated 
the welfare loss of monopoly in Australian manufacturing. They follow 
Cowling and Muller (1978) method and estimate the deadweight loss. They 
modified Cowling and Muller model by including the presence of collusive 
oligopoly effect in their model. Based on the estimation, they arrived at the 
conclusion that the social costs “of monopoly in Australia are substantially 
higher than previous estimates have suggested (Dixon, Gunther and 
Mahmood, 2001:396).” Their estimated aggregate welfare loss was 1.38 per 
cent of average GDP over the period measured in current price. 
                                                 
7 See for instance Young (1997) who approaches this issue by studying price 
leadership behavior. 
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Another study confirming Tullock and Posner studies were developed 
by Baysinger and Tollison (1980). They extend Tullock (1967) and Posner 
(1975) methods by incorporating certain other aspects of reality into the 
analysis of the social costs of monopoly and regulation. When the 
institutional environment within which potential monopolists and consumer 
forces attempt to capture portions of consumer surplus is taken into 
account, results at variance with those of both Harberger and Tullock and 
Posner are generated (Baysinger and Tollison, 1980:22). They study the past 
and current price behavior of regulators under conditions of when state 
action is arbitrary and when state action is predictable. Their conclusion is 
that the social cost of rent seeking is a variable which is functionally related 
to both the past and current behavior of price-setting regulators. Past 
behavior is important in that it informs the formation of expectations by 
those intimately affected by the regulatory process. The expectations so 
formed determine the individually optimal level of resources the parties will 
devote to the ‘monopolization’ process. Current regulatory behavior is 
important in that it determines the static allocative losses which must be 
added to monopolization costs of monopoly and regulation. It stands to 
reason that attempts to extract rents will be fought by affected parties, 
unless such a contest is deemed futile due to the past history of the involved 
authorities. We have demonstrated that Posner’s estimate of social waste is 
too high if parties can predict the outcome of monopoly rights proceedings 
with near certainty, and too low if these outcomes are relatively 
unpredictable. thus while the conventional result that rent-seeking 
expenditures are socially wasteful stands, the degree of such welfare losses is 
related to the nature of the institutional environment within which rent-
seeking takes place (Baysinger and Tollison, 1980:26). 
Therefore, contribution of this study, it can be said, to take into 
consideration the past and current behavior of price setting regulators when 
estimating the social costs of monopoly.  
Baik (1999) sets up a model in which the government decides first 
whether to regulate a monopoly or not. If regulation is appropriate, then, 
which firm should be the monopolist? In this model Baik (1999) seeks to 
address whether consumer surplus defending activities increases or 
decreases the social costs of monopoly. His main conclusion is that “given 
just one rent-seeking firm, consumers’ CS-defending activities generally 
increase the social cost of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking 
firms, such activities generally reduce the social cost of monopoly (Baik, 
1999:551)”. 
Stegemann (1984) also develops a model which investigates foreign 
transactions’ dimension to the issue. His study can be viewed as an 
extension of the Tullock, Posner, Cowling and Mueller perspective that 
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analyzes the issue in an open economy. In other words, it links the existing 
literature to international markets. Stegemann explains the aim of his paper 
as “...most national markets are linked, via imports or exports, to 
international markets. Of course, everybody is aware that the market power 
of domestic producers often depends on the existence of import barriers 
and that the magnitude of the monopoly burden may depend on the level of 
such barriers. Yet it seems necessary to explore more fully the implications 
for the social costs of domestic market power resulting from the existence 
of international competition (Stegemann, 1984:718-719).” He states that “in 
open economies, domestic producers can retain monopoly power for three 
reasons (1) the domestic market is protected; (2) the supply of importable 
perfect substitutes is not perfectly elastic; (3) imports are imperfect 
substitutes of domestic goods (Stegemann, 1984:718).” He employs partial 
equilibrium analysis to investigate the implications for the welfare burden of 
monopoly resulting from the existence of foreign competition in each of the 
three cases (Stegemann, 1984:718). He concludes that “as a consequence, 
monopoly in an open economy may cause a welfare burden by causing 
excessive importation. Importation is excessive because monopolistic 
pricing behavior of domestic producers induces buyers to purchase imports 
when equivalent domestic goods could be produced at a lower social 
opportunity cost (Stegemann, 1984:719).” Therefore, the contribution of 
this study is appreciable since it analyzes the foreign sector’s effect in the 
context of the existence of literature in this area.  
Davis and Reilly (2000) use analytical and experimental methods to 
evaluate rent-seeking and rent-defending behavior of having a monopoly. 
By using various experiments they conclude that “overbidding is persistent 
when bidders have different sharing rules. In fact, the observed social costs 
of rent-seeking often increase just when rent-defending has the greatest 
predicted ameliorative effect (Davis and Reilly, 2000:389).” 
Another good contribution to this literature was developed by Wenders 
(1987). His study mainly extends Tullock’s study considering the parallel 
Tullock’s rent-seeking procedure which briefly says consumers would 
perform some activity to defend consumer surplus. When considered 
simultaneously, potential monopolists would do some activity (e.g., 
lobbying, hiring lawyers, giving bribery, ect.) to get consumer surplus as 
monopoly rent, while consumers would do parallel activity not to surrender 
consumer surplus to monopolists. It is from in this context that Wenders 
concludes  
Under perfect competition among and between buyers and sellers, 
regulation always results in maximum welfare costs, that is, equal to the 
rent-seeking Tullock and Harberger costs under full monopoly pricing. And 
only if sellers succeeded in attaining full monopoly pricing would this result 
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equal the total welfare cost originally proposed by Posner; in all other cases 
the total welfare loss would be larger due to the admission of rent-defending 
Tullock costs (Wenders, 1987:458). 
Studies considering consumer defensive activities against monopoly 
power give conflict results. Epstein and Nitzan (2002) find that social costs 
of monopoly would not be large while Keem (2001) strongly reveal that, by 
assuming asymmetric lobbying abilities across firms, consumer defensive 
activities will increase the social cost of monopoly power.  
A recent empirical study (Yoon, 2004) takes the traditional partial 
equilibrium approach and uses company data in calculating welfare loss of 
monopoly in Korean economy. This study uses manufacturing data of 
selected Korea companies and found 7.56 percent of gross value of 
shipments in 1998 as costs to society resulting from monopoly power in 
Korea (Yoon, 2004: 956). 
Given that partial equilibrium analysis isolates consumers’ utility levels 
and states firmly that monopoly firms seek only to maximize their profits 
leaded researchers to consider the social cost of monopoly in general 
equilibrium framework. Bergson (1973) analyzed the subject in the general 
equilibrium framework to prove that the social costs caused by monopoly 
are large. Bergson, after Stigler, seriously criticized the partial equilibrium 
framework that mainly undergirded Harberger’s approach of a general 
equilibrium model. As Worchester (1975) states, Bergson uses a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function and a linear production 
function to calculate the compensating variation -the additional income 
consumers must receive to offset the loss of utility caused by monopoly 
price. The share of the total market monopolized, the size of monopoly 
prize markup over competitive price and different elasticities of substitution 
(used in place of demand elasticity), are built into his model. Potential 
welfare losses are found by assuming specific values for the parameters. He 
then offers two tables showing welfare losses calculated for a number of 
hypothetical alternatives. He also advocates strongly that monopoly can be a 
matter of consequences (Bergson, 1973). In sum, his contribution on 
theoretical ground is useful for further research; however, the parameters in 
his tables are questionable. 
Recently the general equilibrium model applicable to measure social 
cost of monopoly was   reconsidered in context of “cost minimizing market 
equilibrium” developed by Brown and Wood (2004a; 2004b) and later 
improved by Brown and Yoon (2005; 2006). Brown and Wood (2004a) have 
argued that the purpose of regulating monopolies is to promote allocative 
efficiency.  The deviation of allocative efficiency measured by Debreu’s 
(1951) coefficient of resource utilization can be defined as waste resources 
that represent as social cost of monopoly power. Thus, they developed a 
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general equilibrium model where monopoly firms are assumed both to be 
price takers in competitive factor markets and quantity takers in their output 
markets (Brown and Wood, 2004a). They have illustrated their “cost 
minimizing general equilibrium model” by a number of numerical examples 
and later revised their work (Brown and Wood, 2004b) by following study 
of Shoven and Whalley (1992) to reformulate their general equilibrium 
model. Despite their rationality, they calculated “upper and lower bounds on 
the margin between the monopoly price and the contrafactual competitive 
price in each observation” (Brown and Wood, 2004b, 13). Brown and Yoon 
(2005; 2006) have followed and confirmed Brown and Wood (2004b) study 
on theoretical ground. 
 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have surveyed many important studies that employ 
both partial and computable general equilibrium models to develop 
theoretical bases of a comprehensive measurable social cost of monopoly. 
Most of the studies relied on conventional partial equilibrium model while 
recent studies prefer applicable general equilibrium analysis. 
Based on these models, there have mainly been two different views 
developed in the literature to estimate the welfare effect of the monopoly. 
One view is being that the social costs of monopoly are just Harberger’s 
triangle, and therefore, they are negligible since they are considered to be 
relatively low. The second view is being that the dynamic of monopolization 
should be considered, and the opportunity costs of all efforts by all relevant 
sides in trying to capture and protect monopoly rents should also be 
considered wasteful, and therefore, those costs of efforts should well be 
considered as social costs of monopoly too. When the latter view is 
accepted in its larger meaning, the social costs of monopoly might be 
enormous. On the theoretical ground the literature seems to value the latter 
view whilst empirical studies do not give relatively strong support to this 
view. There are many factors that affect the relative size of the social cost of 
monopoly. They can be listed as follows; 
• Assumptions used 
• Effect of tax distortion 
• Behavior of regulating authority 
• Relative size of rent protecting activities 
• Relative size of rent defending activities 
• Degree of economic development of the economy 
• Degree of differentiation of price from marginal cost 
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• Relative size of monopolized industry in the economy 
• Price elasticity of demand in the monopoly industries 
• Relative size of consumer surplus defending activities 
On empirical grounds, the estimated social costs of monopoly have 
been regarded as low due to technical and measurement difficulties to grab 
all relevant factors in to the analyses. Thus, no one can still claim that the 
size of social costs of monopoly truly estimated, however, new computable 
general equilibrium approaches seem promissory and future research may 
concentrate on this theory to improve it and come up with much better 
understanding. 
 
REFERENCES 
BAYSINGER, B. AND TOLLISON R. (1980) Evaluating the Social Costs 
of Monopoly And Regulation, Atlantic Economic Journal, 8, 22-26. 
BERGSON, A. (1973) On Monopoly Welfare Losses, American Economic 
Review, 63, 853-70. 
BROWN, D. J. and WOOD, G. A., (2004a) The Social Cost of Monopoly 
Power, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-31; Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper No. 1466. 
BROWN, D. J. and WOOD, G. A., (2004b) Competition, Consumer 
Welfare and Monopoly Power, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 
No. 1466R. 
BROWNING, E.K. (1997) A neglected welfare cost of monopoly-and most 
other product market distortions, Journal of Public Economics, 66, 127-
144. 
COWLING, KEITH AND MUELLER D. C. (1978) The Social Costs of 
Monopoly Power, The Economic Journal, 88, 727-748. 
DAVID S. (1960) The Burden of Monopoly, Journal of Political Economy, 68, 
627-30.  
DAVID S. (1961) The Effect of Monopoly; A Correction, Journal of Political 
Economy, 494. 
DAVIS, D. D. AND R. J. REILLY (2000) Multiple Buyers, Rent-Defending 
and the Observed Social Cost of Monopoly, Pacific Economic Review, 
5(3), 389-410. 
DEBREU, G. (1951) The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, Econometrica, 
19, 273-292. 
DIXON, R., A. GUNTHER, AND M. MAHMOOD (2001) The Cost of 
Monopoly in Australian Manufacturing, The Australian Economic Review, 
34(4), 390-402. 
 
The Social Costs Of Monopoly: A Survey And An Evaluation 
 
 
 
164 
EPSTEIN, R. C. (1934) Industrial Profits in the United States, NBER. 
GEORGE J. S. (1956) The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, Journal of 
Political Economy, 64(1), 33-40. 
 HARBERGER, A. C. (1954) Monopoly and Resource Allocation, American 
Economic Review, 77-87. 
KAMERSCHEN, D. R. (1966) An Estimation of the ‘Welfare Losses’ from 
Monopoly in the American Economy, Western Economic Journal, 221-
236. 
KEEM, J. H. (2001) The Social cost of monopoly when consumers resist, 
European journal of political economy, 17, 633-639. 
LEE, YOON-HO ALEX and BROWN, DONALD J. (2006) Competition, 
Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly, Yale Law School: 
Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series. Paper 19. Available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/student/papers/19 (last visited, 28th of July, 
2006). 
POSNER, R. A. (1975) The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 
Journal of Political Economy, 83(4), 807-827. 
SIEGFRIED, J. J. AND TIEMANN T. K. (1974) The Welfare Cost of 
Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Analysis, Economic Inquiry, 12, 190-202. 
SHOVEN, J. AND J. WHALLEY (1992), Applying General Equilibrium, 
Cambridge University Press. 
STEGEMANN, K. (1984) The Social Costs of Monopoly in an Open 
Economy, Canadian Journal of Economics, 17, 718-730. 
TULLOCK, G. (1967) The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. 
WENDERS, J. T. (1987) On Perfect Rent Dissipation, The American 
Economic Review, 77(3), 456-459. 
WORCESTER, DEAN A. JR. (1973) New Estimates of the Welfare loss to 
Monopoly, United States: 1956- 1969, Southern Economic Journal, 40, 
234-45. 
YOON, S. (2004) Welfare Losses due to Monopoly: Korea’s Case, Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 26, 945-957. 
YOUNG, D. P.T. (1997) Dominant firms, price leadership and the 
measurement of monopoly Welfare losses, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 15, 533-547. 
 
